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I
The first modern railroad built was the 12-mile line fromStockton
to Darlington in England, opened to traffic in 1825.Several years
later railroad construction got under way in the United States,
France, and Germany. From its modest beginnings in the1830's
the construction of new railroad lines increased rapidly, but the
period of expanding construction was comparatively brief. The
peak of new railroad mileage was apparently reached in 1848 in
Great Britain, 1875 in Germany, 1884 in France, and 1887 in the
United States. The general trend thereafter was downward.
Secular expansion of new investment in railroads nevertheless
continued. The wave of new line construction was followed by
progressive improvement of existing railroads, especially in the
United States where many of the original roads were lightly built.
A tremendous effort was put into extensions and betterments,
sometimes to accommodate the growing traffic, sometimes to reap
the benefits of advancing technology. Over widening stretchesof
the railroad system single track roads were converted todouble
track, sidings added, grades reduced, curves eliminated, automatic
signals installed, iron rails replaced by steel rails, light rails by
heavy rails, wooden bridges by bridges of steel or concrete,and
a hundred other improvementsin road and equipment made.
Whereas additions to road mileage in the United States reached a
peak in 1887, additions to auxiliary track reached a peak in 19o4;
additions to total track mileage were about as large in 1904 as in
1887; the peak in rail consumption came in 1906, in additions to
leading types of equipment between 1907and1911,inadditions
to book value of investment around 1910.Thusthe peak in
railroad investment expenditures apparently came after the turn
of the century, or some twenty years after the building of new
mileage had passed its maximum.
Meanwhile the total capital invested in the railroads of the
country continued to grow. Traffic grewfaster still. It increased
partly in response to the economic growth and the territorial ex-
pansion of the country; partly at the expense of coaches, canals,
and other waterways which the railroads gradually superseded.
It is difficult to fix the precise date when railroads ceasedgaining
Introduction to Thor Hultgren's American Transportation in Prosperity and
Depression, National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Business Cycles
(1948),pp.vii-xiv.
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on competing means of transport, but it could not have been much
before 1910. By 1920, at any rate, the competitive trend was
already definitely reversed. New agencies of transportation had
arisen—trolley lines, trucks, motor buses, passenger automobiles,
pipelines, the airplane, and revived waterways_and they battled
the railroads for traffic as vigorously as railroads in their youth
had fought their rivals. Passenger traffic reached a maximum in
that year, dropped a full third by 1929, and declined further
during the thirties. Freight traffic continued to grow during the
twenties, but at a lower rate than production. In 1937 the number
of ton-miles of railroad freight was only about four-fifths the 1929
figure, despite an unchanged volume of mineral production, an
increase of 6 per cent in the output of agriculture, and of3 per
cent in manufacturing.
The adverse turn in the fortunes of railroads did not arrest
technical progress in the industry. On the contrary, more powerful
locomotives were installed; trains became longer and faster; main-
tenance work was largely mechanized; and economies of labor,
fuel, and equipment were generally extended. Between 1929 and
1939, while the combined freight and passenger traffic of railroads
fell off a fourth, traffic per man-hour increaseda third. But
physical progress did not leave a visible imprint on the annual
statements of profit or loss. By the end of 1939 nearly a third of
the railroad mileage of the country was in receivership.
The secular shifts in investment and operations were accom-
panied by changes in the organization of the industry and in its
place in society. Once the continent was crisscrossed with railroads,
the addition of new mileage not infrequently resulted ina duplica-
tion of existing facilities. A period of rate wars,maneuvers for
control, and outright consolidations set in. Government, at first
the eager patron of the industry, later became its vigilantoverseer.
Competitive pricing gave way to restrictive practices and sticky
prices. Labor was unionized, and collective bargaining evolved
into nation-wide negotiations and contracts. The federalgovern-
ment added its taxes to those long levied by local authorities, and
a progressively larger part of the traffic dollar was diverted to tax
collectors. In the meantime, the character of entrepreneurshipwas
itself subtly modified. Financing by stock issues gaveway increas-
ingly to bond flotations, and in more recent years internal financ-
ing supplanted both forms of external financing. Posts of authority,
once so largely occupied by financiers, passed to managerial ex-
perts and technicians.
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II
These momentous changes in the life of the railroad industry raise
exciting questions for the student of business cycles. How closely
was the current investment geared to the volumeof traffic or its rate
of change? What of the accumulated supply of facilities and equip-
ment? Did traffic respond the same way to business cycles in the
early stages of the industry as in the later stages? How did employ-
ment react to fluctuations in traffic? While the trendof traffic
moved upward, did cyclical expansion create more jobs than were
lost in the preceding contraction? By what process did railroads
first encroach on other transport agencies, then lose out to new
competitors? Did business depression accelerate or retard the com-
petitive pressure of the innovator? Did the amplitude of fluctua-
tions in traffic widen as the industry matured? What of the fluctua-
tions in costs and revenues? Did government regulation modify
• the behavior of railroad rates during businesscycles? If so, what
were the repercussions on profits?
Thor Hultgren's scholarly study clarifies most of these vital
issues, and some of his findings have a significance that extends
well beyond the boundaries of the railroad industry. For example,
the market for freight service can be estimated for the years 1920
to 1925, and measured with some precision since 1926.Therecord
discloses that the share of the business going to railroads fell almost
uninterruptedly, year after year, from 1920 through 1938. How-
ever, the new transport agencies penetratedthe market faster
during contractions of business cycles than during expansions. I
have noticed a similar cyclical regularity over much longer periods
in the encroachment of open-hearth steel on Bessemer steel and
of by-product coke on beehive coke, and suspect that it is charac-
teristic of the onrush of new products or processes at large.
But if cyclical shifts do occur in the rate at which markets are
diverted from old to new industries, are the shifts not induced by
changes in price relations between the cyclical phases of expansion
and contraction? In the railroad case there seems to be little need
to speculate on this issue. General rate changes"became a con-
spicuous feature of the industry's price-making around the end of
World War I and again in the great depression." Every one of the
general changes ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission
"promoted inverse conformity to freight traffic" (p. 248); in other
1Hultgren,American Transportation in Prosperity and Depression, p. 248. All
other page references, unless otherwise indicated,. are to the text of Hultgren's
report.
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words, the increases in rates came during contractions and the
decreases during expansions of traffic. "During 1929-32 and 1937-
38 rail freight rates, on the whole, declined little or rose" (p. 12).
On the other hand, the rates charged by operators of trucks—which
made the most serious inroads on the railroads' freight business—
not only declined, but probably declined sharply.
Another finding of broad significance concerns equipment. The
era of secular growth in railroad traffic "was one of rather steadily
increasing supplies of cars and locomotives." The succeeding
period "was one of persistently diminishing stocks" (pp. 150-152).
But the positive relation between equipment and traffic over these
long periods eluded the much briefer periods of traffic cycles. Up
to the First World War railroads added to their stocks of equip-
ment in cyclical expansions and contractions alike. From the
middle of the 1920'S or earlier, depending on the type of equip-
ment, stocks diminished whatever the cyclical phase. The rate of
growth or decline in equipment stocks of course varied, but not in
any regular relation to traffic cycles. Judging by the orders placed
for equipment, Hultgren finds that railroad managers did make
an effort to build up stocks faster during expansions. But they
were not highly successful: partly because fairly long intervals
elapsed between the placing of orders for cars or locomotives and
their installation, and partly because retirements moved in quasi-
independent fashion.
It is notable, however, that orders for railroad equipment con-
formed with substantial regularity to traffic cycles, and that cyclical
downturns in orders usually preceded downturns in traffic. A
familiar explanation of the early timing of orders is the 'accelera-
tion principle'—which asserts that equipment stocks tend to main-
tain a rather constant ratio to output, and that requirements of
additional equipment therefore tend to vary with the rate of
change in output. If this investment formula applied to railroads,
the early decline in equipment orders would imply (except for
possible complications arising from retirements) that the rate of
increase in traffic tapers off towards the close of expansions. Accord-
ing to Hultgren's tests this has not often happened; and when it
has, the cyclical peak in equipment orders has sometimes preceded,
instead of accompanied or followed, the maximum rate of growth
in traffic. After a minute examination of movements during
successive traffic expansions, Hultgren concludes that orders have
not, in general, been geared to the rate of growth in traffic. He
carefully notes that his statistical tests may have put excessive
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strain on the rough statisticsof equipment orders;yet he
accents the negative verdict on the acceleration principle by ob-
serving that good economic arguments are lacking for any firm
belief in the principle.
Details aside, it is my impression that Hultgren's conclusions
on the cyclical behavior of railway equipment have a wide range
of application. Other studies of the National Bureau suggest that
during periods of business cycle length a rather inflexible supply
of plant and equipment is characteristic not only of railroads, but
of industry at large. Contracts for industrial plant and orders for
equipment_not to be confused with the volume of work currently
done or the facilities currently installed—commonly turn down
while national income is still rising, and turn up while national
income is still falling. But the early timing cannot be satisfactorily
explained by the acceleration principle. In tests over a range of
industries, I have found that the contracts for new plant or orders
for equipment placed by an industry are fairly closely geared to its
output, but not to the rate of change in output as the acceleration
principle would require. The acceleration principle seems to mis-
represent the play of forces on investment in the short run; never-
theless, it is sometimes the key to movements over long periods.
III
As Hultgren takes the reader through the round of railroad opera-
tions, one fact emerges above all others and in a degree sums them
up. That fact is the pervasive influence of business cycles on rail-
roading. Secular changes in traffic, technology, and organization
have sometimes modified the response to business cycles and fre-
quently obscured it; they have rarely erased it. So also with wars,
blizzards, strikes, and other major disturbances that diversify rail-
road history. The influence of business cycles can be detected in
almost every feature of railroad operations: in the volume of
traffic, its composition, the length of hauls, the load of cars and
locomotives, their active time, the speed of trains, their length,
the size of the labor force, its age composition, the length of the
work month, the fuel consumed, prices received, prices paid, etc.
But the direction, amplitude, and timing of the multitudinous ad-
justments to business cycles are highly variable. To find one's way
through the maze of cyclical reactions, a plan is needed. Hultgren's
plan is to focus attention on the behavior of costs and profits.
The relation of costs to prices during business cycles is of great
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theoretical and practical interest. If unit costs rise during expan-
sion and prices are pushed up, sales may be inhibited. If the rise
in unit costs outstrips the rise in prices, unit profits will decline;
which may darken the prospect for profits and discourage invest-
ment. Both influences are widely thought to play a key role in
bringing cyclical expansions to a close. Are the facts of the railroad
industry consistent with thinking along these lines? What, in
general, do they teach concerning cost-price relations during ex-
pansions and contractions? At this juncture Hultgren makes his
most striking contribution to knowledge. As far as I know, no
work since Mitchell's California classic of 19132 has dealt with
cost-price relations during business cycles with equal thoroughness.
The behavior of costs depends partly on physical input-output
relations, partly on rates of payment for the factors of production
—labor, fuel, materials, and so on. In a strictly physical sense, unit
costs appear to move inversely to cycles in railroad traffic. Labor
requirements per unit of traffic tend to decline when traffic is
expanding, and to rise when traffic is declining. Unit fuel require-
ments likewise tend to move inversely to traffic cycles, and so too
does the ratio of equipment to traffic. But factor rates of payment
normally increase during traffic expansions, while prices of fuel
and materials—if nothing else—tend to decline during contrac-
tions. These movements of factor prices oppose the movements of
unit physical costs, but do not dominate except during violent
inflation such as accompanied World War I. Unit operating ex-
penses therefore usually move inversely to traffic cycles, as do unit
physical costs. Taxes per unit of traffic behave similarly, since this
category of expense fluctuates over a narrower range than traffic.
Rent and interest do likewise. Railroad rates, on the other hand,
are sluggish. As a net result, unit profits' are normally higher at
the end than at the beginning of cyclical expansions in traffic, and
are normally lower at the end than at the beginning of con-
tractions.
I have put Hultgren's conclusions baldly, without stopping to
allow for leads or lags. When they are taken into account, it ap-
pears that unit costs have often started to rise before expansion
ceased, or started to decline before contraction ended. However,
the tendency has not been especially strong; in a fair number of
instances the decline in unit costs continued to the end of expan-
sion, or the rise to the end of contraction. There has also been
some tendency for unit profits to reverse their movement before a
2 Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles, University of California Press (igi).
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phase closed. But "an ominous narrowing of the profitmargin
while the physical volume of business is still growing, and an aus-
picious widening while volume is still diminishing, were nothighly
characteristic of the cyclical course of events. Yet -.-themaxi-
mum level was reached before the end in morethan half the ex-
pansions..-,and.-.theminimum level was reached before the
end in more than half of the contractions. ..-Themaximum and
minimum were sometimes early, never late" (p. 315).
To what extent does Hultgren's demonstration of the power
exercised by expanding output on unit costs apply to other major
industries? What of the rest of his conclusions concerning costs
and profits? What, in particular, of the highly regular tendencyof
railroads to defer maintenance during depression, or the tendency
of their unit profits to rise fastest early in expansion and tofall
fastestearlyin contraction—conclusions ofgreattheoretical
promise that I can no more than mention? And how seriously is
the celebrated account of cyclical changes in efficiency, presented
by Wesley Mitchell thirty-five years ago,3 now in need ofamend-
ment? Reliable answers to these questions will not be forthcoming
until studies similar to Hultgren's are carried out for other im-
portant industries. The statistical records of railroads areunique
in their excellence, abundance, and time span. Useful statistics
nevertheless exist also for other industries. They merit intensive
study, not only for their vital bearing on the cumulative and self-
reversing processes that constitute the business cycle, but also
because so much of the economic controversy that rages in the
practical world centers about the relation of unit costs, prices, and
profits to the volume of production and hence to employment and
national income.
Iv
Transportation events after 1938 are not traced in Hultgren's
volume, except in passing. The war years were marked by an
amazing burst of activity. By 1942 the number of passenger-miles
was larger than in 1920, and by 1944 it wastwice as large. Freight
ton-miles likewise expanded at a furious pace, doubling between
1937 and '944. But the tremendous traffic wasdue partly to the
peculiar circumstances of war, and would not have accompanied
a peacetime economic expansionof equivalent size. Between 1944
and 1947 the number of ton-miles fell off ii per cent, and the
number of passenger-miles 52 per cent.
ibid.
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In '944 the National Bureau published Occasional Paper i,
which examined the experience of railroads during the war. Huh-
gren reached a conclusion of basic importance in this paper; viz.,
despite the vastly increased traffic, the behavior characteristic of
costs and profits during earlier peacetime expansions reappeared.
The duration and amplitude of future cycles in railroad trafficare,
of course, no more predictable than is the course of business cycles
itself. Who could have foreseen ten years ago that railroadpassen-
ger movement would ever again reach the 1920 level? But the
concomitants that business cycles will have in railroad operations
can probably be anticipated with considerable assurance. Hult-
gren rounds out his expert contribution to the economics of rail-
roading in a chapter on "Future Cycles" that merits the most
careful attention of economists.
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